

SECRET

BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

NUMBER 46

DATE: 15 August 1960

TABLE OF CONTENTS

- 273. The Cult of Mao -
- 274. Ernesto Guevara - The Man Who Rules Cuba
- 275. Communists Demand "World Disarmament Conference
- 276. Soviet Approach to Ritual
- 277. BERLIN: Communist Miscalculations and Western Response
- 278. Disarmament: The General Background
- 279. New Force in Africa
- 280. The Sixth and Seventh Meetings of Consultation of the Foreign Ministers of the American States (OAS)

25X1C

SECRET

273. The Cult of Mao

There is substantial evidence that, after a quarter of a century of ever-increasing power, Mao Tse-tung's belief in his own infallibility has become an obsession. His Stalinesque posture, combined with his ignorance concerning the rest of the world and his emphasis on violence as the solution to all problems, presents a serious threat to world peace and stability. By 1949, when the Communists came to power in China, Mao was the undisputed head of the new government. All the successes of the Communists were attributed to his wisdom and valor. During the ensuing years, every "achievement" of the Communist regime was credited to Mao, while "counter-revolutionaries", "rightists", were blamed for the failures. At the launching of the "Great Leap Forward" in 1958, the cult of Mao was pursued with even greater intensity, while Peking's policies, both domestic and foreign, displayed less and less relation to reality. During Mao's tour of the provinces in 1958, Chinese Communist propaganda played him up as a kindly man of the people, while biographical studies were replete with testimonies to his omniscience as a leader. When, in April, 1959, Mao was replaced as head of the state, he retained his chairmanship of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Far from being relegated to a position of less prominence, he was fervently eulogized and continues to be so today. Mao has extended his claim to infallibility as the successor of Marx and Lenin to the international sphere. His gospel is being spread by the Chinese Communists in the underdeveloped countries as well as in East Europe where some of his major writings have recently been translated. His theses on communes as the only road to communism and on the inevitability of war have represented an assault on the Soviet Union's position of leadership in the Communist world.

Guidance

25X1C10b

25X1C10b

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020007-3

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020007-3

~~SECRET~~

15 August 1960

274. Ernesto Guevara - The Man Who Rules Cuba

Major Ernesto "Che" Guevara has long been recognized as the gray eminence in Fidel Castro's Cuban regime. Recent events indicate that he may indeed be the actual strong man. During the current illness of Castro, he has made several major policy statements, and, on 24 July, he signed the Cuban - Communist Chinese trade agreement - the first such agreement signed between Chicoms and any Latin American country. Guevara was born in Rosario, Argentina, in 1928. He studied medicine between 1947 and 1952 and was active against Peron in his student days. Fleeing Peron's Argentina, he wandered from Bolivia to Ecuador to Panama and, finally, to Guatemala, where, in 1954, he worked for the pro-Communist regime of Jacobo Arbenz. When Arbenz was overthrown, he went to Mexico where he met Castro and joined his movement. Guevara played a key role in Castro's military campaigns, wrote a textbook on guerilla warfare, and, following Castro's victory, has occupied a series of important posts, being currently president of the National Bank and de facto economic czar of Cuba. His basic economic policies have been the nationalization and state control of the economy, and the curtailments of economic ties with the US and their replacement by close ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc. He is an outspoken Marxist and has promoted known non-Cuban Communists into key positions in the Cuban government, including the National Bank, the Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA) and his own personal office. (See addendum sheet)

Guidance

25X1C10b

~~FOR THE ASSETS~~

~~SECRET~~

Communist propaganda exploitation of peace, disarmament and ban-the-bomb slogans is being intensified, despite the increasingly sinister sounds of renewed bellicosity which have characterized many statements by Khrushchev and other Communist leaders since the U-2 incident, despite Chicom insistence that "war with the imperialists is inevitable", and despite the fact that the Communists broke up the Summit meeting, left the Geneva disarmament conference, and are now opposing the meeting of the UN Disarmament Commission. The Communist-controlled World Peace Council (WPC) held an "emergency" meeting of its Presidium ("Presidential Council") in Stockholm, 28-29 May 1960. According to PRAVDA, Moscow, 31 May, this meeting, after blaming the US "military command and government (in this order) for the failure of the Summit meeting, reiterated its belief in peaceful co-existence, expressed confidence that another Summit meeting would be held "in the near future" and called "upon all people of good will to pool their efforts to prevent a return to the cold war, to establish peaceful co-existence and to attain disarmament and to create favorable conditions for a meeting of the Great Powers". (FYI: adoption of this resolution had been preceded by a long struggle behind the scenes, largely caused by the insistence of the Chinese Communist delegates that the anti-US line be more strongly emphasized, while certain European delegates -- though also Communists -- wanted the line of the WPC to remain acceptable to non-Communists as well). This was followed by an "extended" session of the WPC Bureau, again held in Stockholm, 9-11 July. It issued a disarmament appeal, stating inter alia, according to TASS: "We demand the calling of an International Conference in which all States, both members and non-members of the UN, would be represented. . . . to achieve disarmament. The first stage must envisage the banning of all means of nuclear weapons delivery and the dismantling of. . . . bases. . . . We demand that all governments proclaim their readiness to take part in this conference with the intention of adopting concrete measures. We demand that all governments now create favorable conditions for such a conference. For this purpose. . . . they must renounce nuclear tests and respect the sovereignty. . . of other nations. We call upon the people of the world to support this demand." The same session also adopted a general declaration, insisting that ". . . the world peace movement must intensify its struggle. . .", welcoming "recent events in South Korea, Turkey and Japan", demanding "the release of all imprisoned peace workers" and recommending a world-wide campaign: "Press for large-scale international solidarity with the peoples fighting for independence. . . . Organize a world-wide referendum for disarmament." "The WPC Bureau recommends that the national peace committees prepare most thoroughly for the next WPC session which will be held before the end of the year, preferably in an Asian country. It will be an important stage in the world-wide campaign for disarmament, against military bases and nuclear tests, and for national independence. . . ."

Guidance

25X1C10b

25X1C10b

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020007-3

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020007-3

276. Soviet Approach to Ritual

Notwithstanding the official Communist position on religion as bourgeois, decadent and unscientific, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the Soviets are showing great concern with the continuance of cultural traditions inside Russia. In the lengthy policy statement on propaganda issued by the Central Committee, CPSU, on 10 January 1960, great emphasis was placed on the necessity of intensifying the struggle against religious prejudices. This intensification is now demonstrated by a series of articles in current Soviet publications, as well as by reports of serious Soviet study of cultural phenomena within Russia. The 30 June 1960 issue of The Listener contains a short article by Walter Kolarz on "Religion and the Russian Peasant". Ostensibly a report on the findings of a recent study group of the Soviet Academy of Sciences concerned with the habits and beliefs of Russian collective farmers, the article in fact points up the growing dilemma of the CPSU in attempting to do away with ritual ceremonial observance of significant social events in the life of the Russian peasant (people?). The Kolarz article points out that the Soviet Academy of Sciences expedition was somewhat perturbed, according to Kommunist, at the extent of religious survivals, such as the presence of ikons in many peasant homes, the widespread observance of religious holidays, and the fact that religious ceremonies - christenings, weddings, and funerals, - are still held in high honor by many people in the Russian countryside. In an article on The Family and Communism by A. Kharchev in Kommunist for November 7, 1959 another aspect of the extent of Soviet concern with their failure to alter many basic aspects of social life in Russia is made clearly evident. The article seeks to assert the "tremendous concern shown by the Party and the Government for strengthening family relations". Its major thesis is the explanation that the Communist attack on marriage, the family, and relations between the sexes was solely directed at bourgeois family life, bourgeois marriages and bourgeois sex.

Guidance -

25X1C10b

25X1C10b

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020007-3

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020007-3

277. BERLIN: Communist Miscalculations and Western Response

In assessing the meaning behind the aggressive tactics adopted by the Soviet Union since the Summit collapse, we must remember that the real test of Soviet intentions lies not in the spate of abuse employed to characterize US policy and leaders (aimed as much at the countries around the periphery of the Soviet Union where we have bases and at the developing areas as at the US itself), but whether - as they recently have implied - they are actually prepared to resort to force to achieve their aims. Lacking proof of any more basic change in Soviet international strategy and in the absence of a specific act of aggression on the part of the USSR, we can assume that the current tough propaganda line represents no more than a concerted tactical maneuver. At present, there is no conclusive evidence that the Soviets are prepared to initiate actions involving a degree of genuine risk. The threats against Berlin have continued: rumors of an annexation coup; the particularly pugnacious and aggressive attitude of the East Germans; their harassment activities which may have gone further than the Soviets intended; their patent attempts to force Moscow's hand; however, the Soviets and East Germans have made ominous statements about Berlin since 1958 and the latest round may well result from a desire not to appear to be retreating from previous demands or from a desire to distract attention from East Germany's internal difficulties (growing food shortages throughout the country and problems arising from government policy of collectivization). Although it is not likely that the Soviets will make any decisive moves against Berlin until after the US election, or at the least, before calling a conference of some kind to discuss the status of Berlin, it is possible none-the-less that the Communists increase pressures on the city and that some form of unilateral action be initiated in October or early November. The possibility that Khrushchev could underestimate the danger involved in unilateral action cannot be ignored. Lesser Soviet initiatives such as the expulsion of Western military missions from East Germany is also possible as a move which would increase Western concern without actually incurring a great risk. Similarly, the Soviets might give the Chinese a green light on Formosa thus testing the US response without immediate Soviet involvement.

25X1C10b

Guidance

25X1C10b

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020007-3

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020007-3

August 1960

278. Disarmament: The General Background

The Soviets wrecked the Summit meeting and walked out of the Geneva 10-nation Disarmament talks; the Nuclear Test Ban Conference, also in Geneva, now in its second year, is bogged down in technical details and may be expected to be recessed -- or entirely broken up -- soon. On the other hand, the UN Disarmament Commission is scheduled to convene August 15 and the forthcoming UN General Assembly, expected to start September 20, can be expected to devote considerable time and attention to disarmament and related issues. Moreover, the Communist campaign for a World Disarmament Conference and the general, intense desires for disarmament and other safeguards against nuclear war, likely to be manifested in parliaments, political parties and other national and international bodies, as well as in mass media anywhere, contribute to make these issues a central problem of high importance for a long time to come. Soviet-Communist treatment of these questions in diplomacy and propaganda is designed to make people believe that (a) the problem can be solved by simple, sweeping agreements between all governments, from "outlawing all nuclear weapons" to Khrushchev's "universal disarmament" plan before last year's UN General Assembly; (b) the prohibition of certain types of weapons and/or the "neutralization" of some countries or zones (Rapacki Plan) will eliminate -- or at least materially reduce -- the danger of war; (c) the danger of war stems exclusively from the Western "imperialists", either from their aggressive intentions against the "Socialist Camp" or from conflicts among themselves or between imperialist and colonial countries (cf Soviet-Communist propaganda on the Suez conflict, US troop landings in Lebanon and, currently, the Congo crisis). These Soviet-Communist tactics have tended to obscure increasingly the true basic facts, i. e.: (1) wars are not started because people have weapons, but because conflicts between nations or their rulers arise and are not settled by peaceful means -- just the same, disarmament is highly desirable in the interest of peace and for economic and social reasons; but unless combined with other effective measures (e. g. universal acceptance of compulsory arbitration in international conflicts, revision of the UN veto so that it cannot prevent such arbitration, etc.), the mere reduction of weapons or elimination of some types of weapons is no panacea against the threat of war; (2) the principal obstacles barring peaceful solutions of pending international problems, including disarmament, are the character and the intentions of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, a group of totalitarian dictatorships, established by means of war and civil war, aiming at world conquest, doctrinally convinced that wars are inevitable in the "transition from imperialism to communism" (unless, of course, the "imperialists" peacefully submit to Khrushchev's avowed intention to bury them), with a record of cynically violating any and all agreements and surrounding their territories with extraordinary secrecy which makes the conclusion of disarmament agreements -- which depend entirely upon mutual trust and effective controls -- extremely difficult. Soviet-Communist tactics in disarmament negotiations -- whether or not designed to lead to any actual agreement -- are always conducted with maximum emphasis on propaganda exploitation. The broad, sweeping demands of the Communist spokesmen make effective copy easy to grasp even for the uneducated, while the patient attempts of Western negotiators to transform


~~SECRET~~

278. (Cont.)

Communist negotiations into specific, enforceable treaty texts, without loopholes for Soviet surprise attacks or other trickery, result in lengthy, tedious speeches and documents, weighed down with technical and legal terms -- and have little impact on broad audiences, not even among educated and political interested readers or listeners. These built-in disadvantages, plus the overt discussion of Western objections to disarmament in general, or to the continued cessation of nuclear tests in particular and other frank, but not especially peaceful utterances by individuals or groups in the free world, weaken the position of the Western powers and permit the Communists to apply added pressure and to derive considerable propaganda profits.

Guidance

25X1C10b



~~SECRET~~


25X1C10b

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020007-3

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020007-3

There are two factors which are outstandingly discernible in the current highly fluid situation in the Congo: the first is the great adroitness and dexterity which the UN has shown under the capable, personal direction of Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold. A feature of this has been the speed with which the UN has acted, following the second of the three Security Council resolutions regarding the Congo on July 14, 21 and August 8. To have assembled an international UN force in as faraway an area as the Congo so swiftly and so effectively after the decision had been taken has made an enormous impression; the action, of course, by far surpasses that of the UN during the Suez crisis and conveys the impression that, if the initial success is not followed by a serious setback, it will mark a turning point in the authority and effectiveness of the UN. The second factor is the willingness with which this UN action has been received in Africa, coupled with the alacrity with which African nations, some of them newly independent, promptly and even eagerly participated. The part played by Tunis, both before the Security Council's resolutions were taken and subsequently as a participant in the UN force, is especially significant. The Kremlin, as might be expected, takes a very dim view of these developments. Moscow undoubtedly thought, and probably still thinks, that the Congo offers it an even greater opportunity for insinuation into Africa than the one it has already seized in Guinea. To witness the UN, so far, doing so well is a source of considerable frustration for the Soviets. Early in August, Pravda alleged that the UN was being "trampled in the dirt". It charged that Hammarskjold was acting in the Congo as a pro-American agent and called the US the mastermind behind the "aggression" in the new African republic. Tass said on August 3 that "a danger is looming not only over the Congo but also over Nigeria, the Mali Federation, Ghana, Guinea, Tunisia, Morocco, and the other independent countries of the African continent." The Soviets seized on the presence of twenty US air-lift personnel in Leopoldville to charge intended aggression. They have made completely unrealistic demands for the more rapid evacuation of Belgian troops and, finally, Mr. Kuznetsov in the UN has urged active hostility by UN troops in Katanga, threatening unilateral Soviet action as the alternative. 25X1C10b

Guidance



~~SECRET~~

25X1C10b

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020007-3

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020007-3

280. The Sixth and Seventh Meetings of Consultation of the Foreign Ministers of the American States (CAS)

The meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the American States, which convened in San Jose, Costa Rica, 16 August, were called in accordance with the provisions of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, signed in 1947 at Rio de Janeiro. They are the Sixth and Seventh such meetings called under these provisions. The Sixth meeting was requested by Venezuela to consider "acts of intervention and aggression of the Government of Santo Domingo" following the abortive attempt on the life of Venezuelan President Betancourt in June 1960. The Seventh meeting was requested by Peru to consider "threats of extra-continental intervention" after Khrushchev's 9 July 1960 statement that he would support Cuba with Soviet rockets in case of "US armed intervention". The meetings represent the top-level machinery of the Organization of American States (OAS) for maintaining the historic principles of mutual hemisphere defense from outside interference and for the peaceful settlement of internal hemisphere disputes. Cuba and the Dominican Republic were the principal figures in the international tensions in the Caribbean area which resulted in the last Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers, held in Santiago, Chile, exactly one year ago. The Declaration of Santiago, which both Cuba and the Dominican Republic signed, listed certain "principles and attributes of the democratic system in this hemisphere"; including, the rule of law assured by the separation of powers, free elections, judicial procedures to protect human rights, freedom of information and expression, effective control of the legality of government acts, and also pointed out that political proscription, perpetuation in power, and the exercise of power without a fixed term are contrary to the democratic system of the Americas. Cuba's violations of these principles has been flagrant. It should also be recalled that the OAS has been a major subject of attack by Communist propaganda since 1954 when the Tenth Inter-American Conference condemned the "activities of the international Communist movement as constituting intervention in American affairs." The Castro regime's treatment of the OAS has assiduously followed the Communist line. For example, Radio Mambi, the regime's most vicious voice, on 9 August, denounced the San Jose meetings as a "puppet show" and stated that President Eisenhower's request for \$600,000,000 for Latin American development was actually a request for a slush fund to use in controlling the meetings. There have also been indications that Cuba plans action in Costa Rica and elsewhere to disrupt the meetings.

Guidance

25X1C10b

25X1C10b

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020007-3

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020007-3

Attachment LOYALTY OF COMMUNISTS TO USSR: 15 August 1960

New York Times, 23 February 1949, page 1, column 1. The following statements were made by Maurice Thorez to the French Parliament:

"If the common efforts of the freedom-loving French do not succeed in bringing our country back into the camp of democracy and peace, if later our country should be dragged against its will into a war against the Soviet Union and if the Soviet Army, defending the cause of freedom and of socialism, should be brought to pursue the aggressors onto our soil, could the workers and people of France have any other attitude toward the Soviet Army than has been that of the peoples of Poland, Rumania and Yugoslavia?" Anglo-Saxon imperialists have adopted an aggressive policy against the Soviet Union that a foreign military headquarters has been established at Fontainebleau and that France and French territories overseas have been transformed into bases for aggression against the Soviet Union and the people's democracies."

New York Times, 27 February 1949, page 1, column 1. i Togliatti statement to reporter from the newspaper Giornale della Sera, 26 February 1949:

"I have no reason to believe that the Soviet Union has the slightest intention of attacking any country or that the Soviet Union has taken or intends to take any step against Italian national interests. On the contrary, the Soviet Union has delivered decisive blows to destroy fascism. Therefore, I consider it absurd to discuss the hypothesis of a war between the Soviet Union and Italy. If anyone advances such a hypothesis it means he thinks that Italy should wage war on the Soviet Union for the reasons that American millionaires would like to wage a war on the Soviet Union; that is to say, because the Soviet Union is not a state of capitalists but a socialist state of workers. As one can see this would not be a national war but a typical war of social classes and ideologies, a war of reaction and capitalists against social progress and the workers. It is evident in this case what the position should be of those who are for social progress and socialism against reaction. I think that in this case (if the Soviet Army were to pursue an eventual "aggressor" on Italian territory) the Italian people cannot but condemn all aggressions and would have the evident duty of helping the Soviet Army in the most effective way possible to give the aggressor the lesson he deserves. Letting the whole world know immediately that the Italian people -- or at least the great majority of their active and fighting part -- think this way will help without a doubt to check aggressors and preserve peace."

New York Times, 1 March 1949, page 12, column 3. Statements made by Harry Pollitt, general secretary of the British Communist Party, at a meeting of party leaders on 27 Feb 1949:

"If provocateurs ask us what we will do in the event of an imperialist, aggressive war against the USSR, we will reply in the same way as Ernest Bevin in 1920 -- organize strikes and councils of action to prevent that war from being carried through."

New York Times, 3 March 1949, page 3, column 7. The text of the statement issued by William Z. Foster and Eugene Dennis on the Communist position in the event of another war follows:

"If, despite the efforts of the peace forces of America and the world, Wall Street should succeed in plunging the world into war, we would oppose it as an unjust, aggressive, imperialist war, as an undemocratic and an anti-Socialist war, destructive of the deepest interests of the American people and all humanity. Even as Lincoln, while a Congressman opposed the unjust, annexationist Mexican War and demanded its termination, so would we Communists cooperate with all democratic forces to defeat the predatory war aims of American imperialism and bring such a war to a speedy conclusion on the basis of a democratic peace."

Extract from booklet Answer Please! Questions for Communists published by Stephen: Naft.

XV. Are the Communists Agents of a Foreign Power?

Can you deny that the first loyalty of Communists is to Soviet Russia, when Earl Browder in New York in 1935 read to 2,000 applicants for Communist Party membership the following solemn pledge: "I pledge myself to rally the masses to defend the Soviet Union, the land of victorious socialism"?

* * * * *

What or who do you believe inspired the sudden rash of declarations by Communist leaders in various countries early in 1949 which included:

The assertion of the Italian Communist leader Palmire Togliatti that if in the case of war "the Soviet army were to pursue an eventual "aggressor" (and in his definition, Italy would have to be considered the aggressor in any war between Italy and Russia) on Italian territory, "the Italian people would have the evident duty to help the Soviet army" (N. Y. Times, Feb 27, 1949);

The explicit statement of several Communist representatives in the Italian Senate and Chamber of Deputies that in case of war, the Soviet troops would be welcomed as "liberators" if they entered Italy;

The declaration of Maurice Thorez, French Communist leader, in a public meeting (Feb. 22, 1949), that "if our country should be dragged...into a war against the Soviet Union, and a Soviet army, defending the cause of freedom and of socialism, should be brought to pursue the aggressor onto our soil, could the workers and the people of France have any other attitude toward the Soviet army than that of Poland, Rumania and Yugoslavia?" (which, according to Thorez, greeted them as liberators and assisted the Soviet army);

The statement of the Danish Communist leader Axel Larsen, the Finnish leader Ville Pessi, the Brazilian leader Julio Prestes, and other Latin-American countries, the Australian Communist leader S. L. Sharkey...that in case of war with the Soviet Union, they would make common cause with the USSR against their own countries;

The pledge of the Dutch Communist leader (as reported from Amsterdam by the A. P., March 8, 1949) that his party would support the Soviet armies if they were "compelled to chase imperialist enemies across the Dutch frontier".

The more or less veiled statement of the American Communist leaders William Z. Foster and Eugene Dennis (released to the newspapers March 3, 1949) which praised the statements of Thorez and Togliatti, and asserted: "...If Wall Street should succeed in plunging the world into war, we would oppose it as an unjust, aggressive, imperialist war...we Communists would cooperate with all Democratic forces to defeat the predatory war aims of American imperialism."

Are not in view of these declarations the Communist parties in all countries traitorous Fifth Columns, ready to stab their own countries in the back in the case of war?

* * * * *

Did not, in 1939, Browder, then the supreme boss of the American Communist Party, openly admit before the Congressional Dies Committee, that party members opposing the Soviet-Nazi Pact which launched the World War, would be expelled? As the membership of the party was not consulted about this pact either in Russia or in America, is the expulsion from an "American" workers party for disagreeing with the foreign policy of another country, dictated by its rulers, not proof that the American Communist Party and its members must obey the orders of Moscow? Does this not make them potential traitors to their own country and agents of the Kremlin?